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In North America, historians of science have always had some interest in the social sciences although most disciplinary research on the contemporary period has focused on the traditional hard sciences of biology, chemistry, and physics. For complex reasons (Backhouse and Fontaine 2014) , historians of social science have paid more attention to psychology, sociology, and anthropology than they have to economics.
Earlier generations of historians of science did not much attend to those whom historians of economics considered canonical -Smith, Say, Malthus, Ricardo, the Mills, Marx, et al. It was left to intellectual historians to write about such individuals. But in the years following World War II, as economics has emerged as a discipline whose practices look familiar to historians of science, their attention has turned to economics in new ways.
Historians of the social sciences, who had often been marginalized in history of science programs, have now found a rich mine of researchable topics in economics. Indeed, their incursions into the history of economics are quite changing the way such history is presented (Fontaine 2016) .
Most of what has been written on the history of recent economics by American
economists has been what Bruno Latour (1988, 218) called "Legends of the Saints".
Samuelson, Schumpeter, and Stigler and others fostered the notion that only those who were sophisticated economists have the authority to write about the history of modern economic science. As they themselves held their own work in high regard, they spent a lot of effort to read intellectual heroism into economics' past. Samuelson was not speaking ironically when he described himself, like Newton, as "standing on the shoulders of giants." Much as André Weil (1978) told the International Congress of Mathematicians in Tokyo that the history of mathematics should be written by eminent mathematicians, economists have spent most of their historiographic energy attending to the organized self-reflections of major economists. Contemporary interviews with famous economists by either famous or not-so-famous economists purport to provide a record of the development of modern economics even as they crowd out serious historical research.
Economists who are not historians have their own interest in the history of modern, defined roughly as post WWII, economics. They are consumers-scholars naturally interested in their own profession. Their interests, especially in their own subspecialty fields, often concern the appropriate awarding of credit, of who did what when, and how a well-known figure got to be well-known. Since the creators of new knowledge are rewarded with tenure, promotions, salary, prizes, offices, honors and such, it often is assumed that historians of economics are supposed to be in the business of adjudicating rival creation claims and then awarding gold stars (Düppe and Weintraub 2014, 204-229) . That they are not so occupied is a source of some puzzlement to many mainstream economists. If they are not in the crediting business, what is it that historians of economics do anyway, and why is it worth doing (see, e.g. Binmore 2012)?
But it is not as if North American economists are trained to do serious historical research. Unlike the American Mathematical Society, the American Chemical Society, and the American Physical Society, economists' professional organizations do not encourage research into their discipline's history. Consequently many economists writing the history of economic science tend to write what historians call under researched and over interpreted history. Until fairly recently, it was not the case that historians of modern economics even attended to archival materials, syllabi, correspondence, institutional records, and other staples of historical research. Instead they attempted to construct an account of the past using simply the published written materials that past economists left for others to study. The common idea, anathema to historians, that the works themselves tell their own story and do not depend on readers' understandings and interpretations, meant that context was usually ignored in the search for the "true meaning" of say Keynes' Theory of Liquidity Preference or Hayek's Spontaneous Order or Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. A predictable consequence of removing the study of history of economics from all major U.S. economics Ph.D. programs has been that a number of young European economists, some with a sophisticated understanding of the nature of research in the history of science -from France, The Netherlands, Austria, Germany, Italy, and Portugal -are shaping the field's future within the economics community. Gordin, a professor of history at Princeton. Daston is a distinguished historian of science, and her multiyear, multi-book career has provided historians and philosophers with new ways of looking at objectivity, the probabilistic revolution, scientific facts, scientific objects, and the moral authority of nature. This book has several overlapping connections with Erickson's book on game theory, not least of which of course is that Erickson was member of the Berlin working group. The book's subtitle, "The Strange Career of Cold War Rationality" suggests the book's narrative intent. The Berlin Institute's workshop was titled "The Strangelovian Sciences" and the authors state The aim of this book is to make the label 'Cold War rationality' stick … Cold War rationality in all its variants was summoned into being in order to tame the terrors of decisions too consequential to be left to human reason alone, traditionally understood as mindful deliberation (2).
Reminding us that "rationality" has been studied mostly within specific disciplinary histories, they want to provide a discussion that is "larger than [a disciplinary The early chapters 1 and 2 describe how, following World War II, questions of how to "reason" became salient: MIT computer scientist Joseph Weissman claimed that "the reason in question was restricted to 'formal thinking, calculation, and systematic rationality'" (29). Rationality was to be captured by a "finite well-defined set of rules to be applied unambiguously in specified settings -without recourse to the faculty of judgment so fundamental to traditional ideas of reason and reasonableness" (29). The authors show that Cold War rationalists, the action intellectuals, were never as unified as something like a "school". Nevertheless they shared the assumption usually unstated that "whatever rationality was, it could be stated in algorithmic rules -whether these were strategies in game theory, the consistency specifications of personal utilities, linear Quarterly became an important publication outlet for such work. Simon, at GSIA, argued that the "economists' representation of rationality as an optimal outcome for a goal-oriented decision maker was unrealistic and incomplete. Simon's emphasis on procedural rationality begged for a psychological focus on the process of problem solving" (80). This insight opened the door for psychology. analyzing the interactions in small groups through observation using hidden investigators, claimed to have found an ideal method "to control the entire group, as a conductor of an orchestra and each musician his instrument. Bales had found that all groups worked as systems, but some were better systems than others. With his method, he could discover which factors made groups able to reach a 'stable and successful' equilibrium state and others unable" (123). The "situation" emerged as an attempt to focus attention on smallscale controlled environments using tools and methodologies from sociology, cultural anthropology, social psychology, etc., in "laboratory like scenarios in quasi laboratory situations" (112) where observation and intervention could be observed close at hand. result of this kind of work suggests Today's concern across a number of disciplines with rational choice
[is] a far cry from the Cold War rationality debate, whose participants took for granted a shared starting point for formulating a new, improved rationality equal to the challenges of preserving the world from nuclear immolation. It is easy to find fragments of the debate in this or that sub discipline; it is all but impossible to find anything like the debate itself -its depth, its breadth, its exhilarating and terrifying sense of urgency…If in retrospect, from a comfortable distance and safe in the knowledge that the Cold War did not in fact erupt into the hottest war in human history, the drama looks more like melodrama --at times even rendered as farce -that is simply proof of how extraordinary and extraordinarily strange, those times were. Most explorations of game theory's history have focused on economics. Erickson sees matters differently. Erikson argues that the view from economics constrains our understanding of the development of game theory itself: "when viewed up close, game theory comes across less as a coherent entity with a well-defined character, message, or ideological content, and more as a cluster of conceptually pregnant metaphors, notations, axioms, and techniques that hang together not because of their internal structure but as a result of accidents of history" (9). He suggests that this perspective, and the history that it produces, "[by] emphasizing the internal diversity of the game-theoretic corpus avoids the temptation to essentialize game theory, equating it with Nash equilibrium concept or granting it some essential character, and embracing the fact that game theory's identity was a constant point of contestation throughout this [Cold War] era and afterwards" (9).
Erickson's intellectual stance is important but unfamiliar and possibly uncongenial to those economists who believe that game theory, though it developed outside the economics community, is now properly associated with the economics community. It has a major role in economic analysis and even economic policy work, as testified to by Nobel prizes to John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash Jr., Reinhard Selten, Robert J. Aumann, Thomas C. Schelling, Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley. In contrast, the historian will always emphasize the contingency of a particular historical process (like the development of game theory) and the particular context in which that process occurred. To write history is to write context, and attention to both the personal and institutional lend weight to a narrative of scientific change. Game theory was not the Theory of Games's appeal lay precisely not in providing a complete system or definitive piece of work, but in its heterogeneous collection of notations, metaphors, terminology, and results that could be appropriated, reinterpreted, and put to work in a variety of contexts" (73).
Erickson's next examines how game theory came to be employed in assessing "military worth". In WWII the Applied Mathematics Panel (AMP) was directed by the mathematician Warren Weaver and staffed with nontraditional mathematicians, specifically applied mathematicians very different from the usual university scholar.
Statistics, computation, and so on were important. As the war ended the concept of military worth, an index capturing gains and losses associated with a particular operation, "would form the centerpiece of Warren Weaver's 'Analytical Studies in Aerial Warfare' which appeared [in 1945 ]" (86). Weaver's own account stressed that "Military worth, as the phrase is here used, is closely related to the general concept of utility in economic theory. And the reader is warmly encouraged to read the discussion of a numerical theory of utility given… in the 'Theory of Games in Economic Behavior'" (88).
From here the story moves to RAND, which was constructed along the same lines as the AMP. Erickson points out that "With mathematicians such a significant presence inside Project RAND, game theory per se became institutionalized as an active area of research, so that even though many of the resulting papers bore the mark of Weaver's "military worth" agenda, the internal logic of the mathematicians' discipline also began to assert itself… [indeed RAND's first hire, and chief mathematician John D.] Williams pushed the mathematicians under his direction towards research in game theory that might be relevant to the development of mathematical theories of air warfare" (93). In particular, the mathematicians developed game theoretic models of aerial duels, and that led to dueling problems more generally, like silent duels and three person duels. They also began working on pursuit games like those of fighter planes versus bombers, and attack versus killer submarines.
When wartime planning, with seemingly unlimited budgets, faced postwar realities of financial constraint, the military faced real challenges to make policy decisions about which projects to support and which to abandon. Developing analyses of competing programs turned into programming, a field of formal mathematical inquiry.
The theory of programming engaged the individuals at RAND and, making connection with the research group at the Cowles Commission in Chicago, they jointly put together symposia devoted to game theory initially at the summer meetings of The Econometric Society in 1948 and subsequently at the Cowles conference, sponsored by RAND, on Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation Weintraub 2014, 2014a) . As a result of these kinds of moves and these kinds of inter-relationships, Erikson argues that "the theory of the 2-person zero-sum game…became a theory of maximization or optimization -a fundamental transformation in the meaning of the theory, since von Neumann and Morgenstern had imagined game theory as an alternative to the naïve optimization theories they saw in the mathematical economics of their day" (107).
This point is both important and unappreciated by most economists, especially game theorists. From his Austrian perspective, Morgenstern was contemptuous of neoclassical economics. Von Neumann was contemptuous of economists' mathematics, remarking that while the calculus was developed in the 17th century, calculus based (neoclassical) optimization theory was too narrow, too ignorant of individual and group conflict, to be a basis for solving any nontrivial economic problem (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944, 1-8) . Von Neumann believed, (and confided to Morgenstern who wrote about it in his diary) that Samuelson "has murky ideas about stability. He is no mathematician and one should not credit him with analysis. And even in 30 years he won't absorb game theory [October 8, 1947 ]" (Mirowski 2002, 138-139n41) . Von Neumann's cooperative game theory, as Leonard (2010) showed, was an attempt to grapple with the conflicts between individual behavior and group behavior at the root, he believed, of the collapse of European civilization that produced WWII.
The next marker in this complex story was John Nash's equilibrium theorem for N person games. But beyond that paper, in thinking through what had been the cooperative game analysis launched by von Neumann and Morgenstern, Nash was able to suggest "that any cooperative game could be transformed into a noncooperative game" (112). This move seemed natural at the time, "but pursuing this agenda ultimately led Nash into intellectual territory that was a more problematic fit with the context of military worth analysis or the study of logistics" (113). What was troubling about this reduction of cooperative to non-cooperative games was that ideas about power, trust, and knowledge in social situations kept reappearing in the military's multi-player games. Finessing such issues by dumping them into "pre-play communication" games made the resulting noncooperative game less interesting to military planners: understanding how real players made real decisions was the paramount Cold War strategy concern. The Nash equilibrium, so distant in concept and purpose from von Neumann and Morgenstern's solutions to cooperative games, opened the way to a kind of comment that Erickson got between the ESS and the Nash equilibrium, showing that the ESS was a particular kind of Nash equilibrium…or a particular equilibrium refinement" (240). This led to the never clearly articulated hope "that a final theory of games encompassing the economies of nature and society alike was just around the corner. (241) Economists of course are comfortable with the history from this point on.
Erickson explores this explosion of interest in the Nash equilibrium and suggests that "the proliferation of 'game theories' has gone hand in hand with the further disintegration of any straightforward conception of 'rationality' and the problematization of game theory's rationality postulates more generally…Straightforward and generally applicable rules of rationality will not necessarily get you where you want to go" (244).
Erickson refuses to provide a simple closure with any last word. Instead, he tells us "game theory, as it has been bequeathed to its latter-day practitioners, provides a heterogeneous collection of tools for notating, speaking, and reasoning within the human sciences. But while these can prove exceptionally useful and ergonomic, if the debates…are any guide, they are unlikely to be the only possible ones. They are the thus to some extent traditional and conventional -an outgrowth of a particular history and set of practices for the study of reasoning and social interaction" (271).
Economists most likely will be dissatisfied with this conclusion. The result of a long analysis or narrative somehow should, an economist expects, lead to an appraisal of the enterprise described or a solution to a problem posed. Historians though are not economists. A historian writing a history of the Office of Naval Research would be unlikely to conclude that it "worked" or "didn't work" (Sapolsky 1990 ) but would describe instead how it worked, and how it developed in the context of competing interests and complexly intertwined communities. So too with a history of the world in which game theory was born and developed.
As North American economists who specialize in writing the history of economics are increasingly scarce on the ground, histories of economics will more frequently construct economists as "them" not "us". Historians of science will more frequently treat economics as a wider set of practices and communities than economists do themselves. In an ironic twist, historians of science who simply treat economics as an appropriate subject of their research have laid to rest the hoary controversy about whether economics is or is not a science. This move, manifest in the two books discussed here, makes economics part of a richly interesting conversation about the growth of knowledge in and about the modern world. Even better, the authors of these volumes set a high standard for historical research and writing about our discipline.
